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fuel additives in gasoline, including oxygenates, which
increase the oxygen content of fuels. Congress included
the oxygenate provisions to placate special interests,
particularly the ethanol lobby. 8 Adding oxygenates to
fuel increases the price of gasoline but does not do much
to help clean the air. In some cases, oxygenates can
reduce emissions of one pollutant at the expense of
increasing another. Worse, the most widely used
oxygenate, methyl tertiary butyl ether ("MTBE") has been
linked to widespread water contamination.9 In the state
of Michigan alone, some 500 wells are contaminated with
MTBE. 10 This is hardly the only time the CAA has
produced perverse environmental results. Provisions in
the 1977 legislative amendments, for example, were
designed to benefit regional coal producers at the
expense of their competitors, and air quality suffered as a
result.11
Enacted in 1973, the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") 12
was supposed to bring species back from the brink of
extinction. Yet in nearly thirty years, fewer than thirty of
over 1,000 domestic species have been taken off the
endangered and threatened species lists. Of these, more
have been delisted by reason of extinction than because
of recovery due to the ESA's protections.13 One problem
is that regulatory protection for endangered species

8. For all the gory details of how the oxygenate provisions became law, see
generally Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS:
PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael Greve & Fred Smith eds., 1992)
[hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS].
9. See Ben Lieberman, Running on MTBE: Closing the Pumps on the Oxygen Content
Requirement, CEI ONPOINT No. 50, available at http:/ /www.cei.org/
OnPointReader.asp?ID=833 (Oct. 29, 1999).
10. See David Mastio, Legal, Scientific Attacks Hobble EPA, DETROIT NEWS, May 8,
2000, at A1.
11. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL, DIRTY AIR
(1981).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2000).
13. See Robert E. Gordon, Jr., James K. Lacey & James R. Streeter, Conservation
Under the Endangered Species Act, 23 ENV'T INT'L 359 (1997); see also Ike C. Sugg,
Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its Effects on Man and
Prospects for Reform, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 42-44 (1993). It is worth noting that many
of the alleged "successes" of the ESA are nothing of the kind and involve species
that were either never in danger of extinction or were helped by exogenous
factors. See id. (discussing the examples of the Palau dove, Palau fantail flycatcher,
Palau owl, Rydberg milk-vetch, and American alligator).
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discourages habitat conservation on private land.
land-use restrictions make ownership of
endangered species habitats a liability instead of an asset.
The presence of a listed species can freeze the use of
private land, barring everything from home construction
and timber cutting to farming and clearing firebreaks.
Faced with this risk, landowners respond accordingly.
Indeed, there is increasing evidence that landowners
preemptively destroy potential habitat rather than risk
federal regulation. 14
These are but a few examples of the harms caused by
existing environmental programs, each of which costs the
American people billions of dollars per year. Taken as a whole,
today' s environmental regulations impose substantial costs and
inequitable burdens, generate meager benefits, and divert
resources from environmental efforts that could produce more
significant gains.
This Article seeks to outline an alternative approach to
environmental policy, one based on market institutions and
property rights instead of central planning and bureaucratic
control. In principle, this entails nothing less than a complete
reorientation of existing environmental policy. The aim is both
to improve environmental protection and to lessen the costseconomic and otherwise. It seeks to enhance environmental
protection without sacrificing individual rights or economic
liberty, to safeguard environmental values without expanding
government control of Americans' lives, and to find solutions
grounded in market institutions, not regulatory bureaucracies.
Part II of this Article diagnoses the problem with
conventional approaches to environmental policy. It is not
merely that existing regulations and programs are inefficient or
overly bureaucratic. Rather, the failure of existing
environmental strategies is the inevitable result of an outlook
that views government regulation as the proper policy
response to each and every activity that produces an
environmental impact. This approach to environmental policy
is a recipe for ecological central planning and is destined to fail.
14. See Dean Lueck, The Law and Politics of Federal Wildlife Preservation, in
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN 107-10 (Terry
L. Anderson ed., 2000) [hereinafter POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM]; Sugg, supra

note 13, at 43.
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Part III provides a cursory outline of an alternative paradigm
for environmental protection that is grounded in market
institutions, particularly property rights. This vision is often
referred to as "free market environmentalism." By focusing on
institutions and the incentives that they create, this approach to
environmental policy seeks to reconcile human demands
economic well-being, safety, and environmental protection by
incorporating environmental resources and values into the
marketplace, rather than regulating them outside economic
institutions.
A new science of environmental protection will not, indeed
cannot, be implemented overnight. Political and institutional
change is necessarily incremental. With this in mind, Part IV
outlines a series of principles that should guide those interested
in a more efficient, effective, and equitable approach to
environmental protection, and offers specific examples of
policy reforms that can reconcile environmental protection and
market institutions.

II. DIAGNOSING THE PROBLEM
A. The Call for Change

Environmental regulation imposes a large and growing
burden on the United States economy. In 1999, environmental
regulations cost an estimated $206 billion- over one-quarter of
the total federal regulatory burden.15 These costs are rarely
readily apparent; rather, they are buried in the costs of
products and services throughout the economy. Apparent or
not, the pinch is real- over $2,000 for the average family of
four in 1999.16 These numbers will only increase in the years to ·
come. In late 1999, the EPA's accounted for over ten percent of
137
all new rules in the regulatory pipeline. 17 Of
forthcoming major rules identified by the federal government
in October 1999, the EPA accounted for twenty-eight, over
twenty percent of the total, and more than any other federal

15. See CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL
POLICYMAKER'S SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 4 fig.3 (3d ed.
2000) (figure in 1998 dollars).
16. See id.
17. See id. at 17 fig.13.
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agency. 18
Environmental regulations are certainly costly. The relevant
question is whether they produce much in return. After all, if
the benefits outweigh the costs, it may not be worth quibbling
over the price tag. The EPA claims that many pf its rules
represent cost-effective approaches to pressing environmental
concerns, but critics suggest otherwise. 19 Assessing the record
is difficult due to the lack of consistent reporting by regulatory
agencies of regulatory costs and benefits. 20 Moreover, it is
difficult- if not impossible- to account accurately for the value
of environmental protection, particularly in the context of
unowned, i.e., "public," resources. 21
There is no question that the early environmental laws
seemed to work well. 22 Beginning in the 1960s, many indicators
of environmental quality showed distinct improvement. 23 Some
of these gains were likely due to the first generation of federal
environmental regulation. The rest occurred due to state and
local efforts or other extraneous factors. 24 The initial generation

18. See id. at 19 fig.15. "Major" rules are the most significant regulations-those
that are estimated to cost over $100 million annually and classified as
"economically significant." !d. at 18-19.
19. See generally, e.g., Robert W. Crandall, Frederick H. Reuter & William A.
Steger, Clearing the Air: EPA 's Self-Assessment of Clean Air Policy, REG., Vol. 19,
No.4, at 35 (1996) (critiquing the EPA's retrospective study of costs and benefits
under the CAA); Craig S. Marxsen, The Environmental Propaganda Agency, IND.
REV., Vol. V, No.1 (2000) (same).
20. See CREWS, supra note 15, at 32-34; Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing
Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply with Executive Order
12,866, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 859, 865-77 (2000).
21. See, e.g., Donald J. Boudreaux, Roger E. Meiners & Todd J. Zywicki, Talk Is
Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVTL. L. 765 (1999).
22. The record, however, is clearly mixed. For instance, "none of the available
data" are able to demonstrate that water quality nationwide is demonstrably
better than it would have been absent the Clean Water Act. A. Myrick Freeman III,
Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 97,
114 (Paul Portney ed., 1990); see also Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Clean
Water Legislation: Reauthorize or Repeal?, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY
73,86-87 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 1993).
23. See generally, e.g., BORIS DEWEIL, STEVEN HAYWARD, LAURA JONES & M.
DANIELLE SMITH, INDEX OF LEADING ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS FOR THE U.S.
AND CANADA (1997) (documenting improvement in many environmental
indicators over the past several decades).
24. For example, available air quality data indicates that emissions of at least
some air pollutants declined more rapidly before the onset of federal air quality
regulation. This case is made quite extensively in INDUR GOKLANY, CLEARING THE
AIR (1999). Goklany discusses EPA data showing particulate emission reductions
to be significantly greater in the 1960s than after the CAA took affect. "These data
also call into question one of the fundamental premises behind the [CAA]: that
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of environmental policy was effective principally because it
was plucking low-hanging fruit; removing lead from gasoline
and preventing the disposal of raw sewage in rivers were
relatively easy issues to address. Environmental problems were
obvious and economical policy measures were readily
available. Not so any more.
Today few low-hanging fruit remain, and the existing
regulatory system is ill-equipped, if not constitutionally unable,
to reach any higher. 25 As regulations tighten, they yield·
diminishing marginal returns. In 1997, the EPA proposed a
further tightening of national ambient air quality standards for
ozone ("smog") and particulate matter ("soot"). Independent
analysts estimated the new rules could cost as much as $90 to
$150 billion per year to implement. 26 By the EPA's own
estimates, the costs of the new ozone standard would exceed
the benefits.Z7 One reason is that all of the relatively
inexpensive control measures have been adopted. For example,
under current federal regulations, a new car produced in 2000
emits over 90 percent fewer emissions than a car produced just
a few decades ago. 28 There is not much more to be gained by
tightening these standards even further.
Continuing to press for further incremental gains is
increasingly expensive and, in some cases, results in net
environmental harm. 29 For instance, when reviewing the EPA's
states and local governments never would impose the controls necessary to
achieve healthful air." Paul Portney, Air Pollution Policy, in PUBUC POUCIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 98 (Paul Portney ed., 2d ed. 2000).
25. For a discussion of some of the constitutional limits to federal environmental
regulation, see Jonathan H. Adler, Comment, The Green Aspects of Printz: The
Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for Environmental Law, 6 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 573 (1998) (outlining the potential impact of Printz v. United States and other
federalism decisions on federal environmental regulation).
26.. See ANNE E. SMITH ET AL., COSTS, ECONOMIC IMPACTS, AND BENEFITS OF
EPA'S OZONE AND PARTICULATE STANDARDS (Reason Pub. Policy Inst., Policy
Study No. 226, 1997).
27. See U.S. EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards Innovative
Strategies and Economics Group, Regulatory Impact Analysis for Proposed Ozone
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (Research Triangle Park, N.C., December
1996); see also Susan E. Dudley & Wendy L. Gramm, EPA's Ozone Standard May
Harm Public Health and Welfare, 17 RISK ANALYSIS 403 (1997).
28. See K.H. Jones & Jonathan Adler, Time to Reopen the Clean Air Act: Clearing
Away the Regulatory Smog, POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 233, tbl.7 (Cato Institute, 1995),
available at http:/ /www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-233.html.
29. See generally David Mastio, EPA Adapts to New Environmental Challenges,
DETROIT NEWS, May 9, 2000, at A1 (reporting observation of Paul Portney,
President of Resources for the Future, that "[a]s the agency attacks smaller
problems, the danger is that some of the consequences of environmental
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proposed revisions to national air quality standards, the Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found that the EPA ignored
evidence that further tightening the ozone standard could have
negative impacts on public health. 30 Today' s hyper-stringent
environmental regulations are themselves substantial barriers
to ecological conservation and pollution reduction in many
sectors of the economy. Newer technologies are often subject to
more stringent environmental regulations despite their
potential to reduce environmental impacts. As the Clinton
Administration noted in its report Reinventing Environmental
Regulation: "Prescriptive regulations can be inflexible, resulting
in costly actions that defy common sense by requiring greater
costs for smaller returns. This approach can discourage
technological innovation that can lower the costs of regulation
or achieve environmental benefits beyond compliance."31
These problems in environmental policy have gradually
produced a consensus on the need for significant reform. With
few exceptions, environmental analysts recognize that changes
must be made in order for environmental gains to continue into
the twenty-first century. "The EPA's programs need some
major rethinking, and they're not getting it," observes Terry
Davies of Resources for the Future. 32 According to the United
States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
"federal rules and procedures governing decisionmaking for
protecting the environment often are complex, conflicting,
diffiCult to apply, adversarial, costly, inflexible, and
uncertain."33 Analysts at the Progressive Policy Institute, a
think tank affiliated with the Democratic Leadership Council,
protection will be as bad or worse than the original problem we were trying to
solve").
30. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1999), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001).
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the EPA's refusal to consider
the radiation-blocking potential of tropospheric ozone violated the Clean Air Act.
Id. at 1051-53; see also Randall Lutter & Christopher Wolz, UV-B Screening by
Tropospheric Ozone: Implications for the National Ambient Air Quality Standard, 31
ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 142A, 145A (1997) (documenting likely rise in UV-B exposure
due to reductions in tropospheric ozone).
31. William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Reinventing Environmental Regulation,
NAT'L PERFORMANCE REV., Mar. 1995, at 2.
32. Mastio, supra note 10.
33. U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A-122,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL DECISIONMAKING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
PUBLIC WORKS 1 (1992), cited in Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism:
Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1165 (1995).
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note that existing environmental regulations "are increasingly
inefficient in a fast-paced economy and too rigid" to address
modern environmental concerns. 34 "The current system,
consisting
mainly
of
end-of-pipe,
technology-based
regulations, is inadequate for the challenges ahead," observes
Karl Hausker who oversaw the Enterprise for the Environment
project, an effort to develop a consensus on environmental
reform. 35 Most analysts agree on the need for change, if not on
the kinds of change required.
B. The Failure of Central Ecological Planning

Conventional environmental policymaking presupposes that
only government action can improve environmental quality. In
this view, environmental problems arise from "market failures"
that produce "externalities." Governmentregulation is needed
to correct environmental concerns that the market has failed to
handle because they are "external" to the price signals that
regulate marketplace transactions. To say that the market has
failed simply means that human activity has generated an
environmental impact that is not accounted for in the price of
that activity. Thus, the conventional paradigm of
environmental policy justifies the regulation of all activitiesfrom driving a car to turning on a light bulb- that have an
impact on the environment that is not factored into the cost of
the product or service. Economic central planning may be
intellectually and historically discredited, but the "market
failure" thesis justifies environmental regulatory control of just
about everything. As a result, current regulations tell
landowners where they can build a home or plant a garden and
instruct businesses on how best to manufacture goods and
handle byproducts. Indeed, the federal government has passed
environmental regulations governing everything from the
chemical composition of gasoline36 to the design of home

34. Debra S. Knopman & Marc K. Landy, A New Model of Governance,
Fall 2000, available at http:/ fwww.ppionline.org/ndol (last visited
Feb. 17, 2001).
35. Karl Hausker, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Only Path to a
Sustainable Future, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10148, 10148 (1999).
36. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (2000) (directing the EPA to "promulgate
regulations under this section establishing requirements for reformulated gasoline
to be used in gasoline-f1;1eled vehicles in specified nonattainment areas").
BLUEPRINT,
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appliances, including washing machines and toilets. 37 As
environmental analyst Richard Stewart observed, "the system
has grown to the point where it amounts to nothing less than a
massive effort at Soviet-style planning of the economy to
achieve environmental goals."38
The dilemma for policy makers is that ecological central
planning cannot succeed any better than its economic cousin.
Indeed, the likelihood of long-term success is even less in the
environmental context; planning the "production" of air quality
or other ecological "goods" is orders of magnitude more
complex· than planning the production of shoes or wheat.
Centralized regulatory agencies are ill-equipped to handle the
myriad ecological interactions triggered or impacted by private
activity. No doubt the first generation of environmental
regulations produced some significant gains-just as the Soviet
economies once appeared productive. 39 Over time, however,
every centrally planned economy collapsed under its own
weight. As centralized environmental regulations reach their
limit, they too begin to falter.
In the Soviet system, further gains in production were
achieved for a time through the reliance upon tradable quotas
and other efforts to design a IJ'market socialist" system. 40 Similar
proposals are forwarded today to add market incentives to the
existing regulatory infrastructure. Nonetheless, most
environmental analysts recognize that federal regulatory
policies are too costly and ineffective and cannot be relied upon
into the future. 41 The problem is not merely one of regulatory
design; it lies at the core of the current environmental
37. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, § 123, 106 Stat. 2817, 2817-32
(1992) (setting water efficiency standards for toilets); see also Energy Conservation
Program for Consumer Products: Clothes Washer Energy Conservation
Standards, 65 Fed. Reg. 59,550-01 (2000) (to be codified at 10 C.P.R. pt. 430) (notice
of proposed rulemaking on water efficiency standards for washing machines).
38. Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic
Incentives, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'Y 153, 154 (1988).
39. Some, such as John Kenneth Galbraith, were celebrating the alleged success
of the Soviet economic system into the 1980s. See, e.g., John Kenneth Galbraith,
Reflections: A Visit to Russia, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 3, 1984, at 54, 65 (claiming that
"the Russian system succeeds because in contrast to the Western industrial
economy it makes full use of its manpower").
40. See Paul Georgia, Owning the Unownable, in ECOLOGY, LIBERTY & PROPERTY:
A FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTAL REAOER Gonathan H. Adler ed., 2000).
41. See, e.g., Hausker, supra note 35, at 10148 (arguing that environmental
regulation must be reinvented to ensure sustainability).
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approach.
Under the conventional approach to environmental policy,
federal regulators who are located in or at least are responsible
to Washington identify the greatest environmental concerns for
the nation as a whole. Next they must identify the causes of
these problems, and the proper solutions. Regulatory strictures
must be designed to account for the myriad differences
between industries, communities, and ecosystems. Monitoring
and compliance systems must be developed to ensure that
standards are met and dictates are obeyed. Because the federal
government itself cannot be trusted; additional measures are
necessary, including strict legislative deadlines, private "citizen
suit" provisions that can force the government's hand, and
"parallel" liability systems to impose additional costs upon
noncompliant firms. 42 It does not end there. As circumstances
change, the whole system must be revised to take into account
new factors by incorporating new environmental threats into
the system without forgetting to address the old.
Such a system cannot work because each and every step
requires more information than can be realistically gathered or
processed. Environmental problems are not uniform, nor are
their solutions. The carrying capacity of a given pasture or
stream or the vulnerability of a given ecosystem to disruption
changes with time and place. One river may suffer from
excessive nutrient loads, another from a deficiency. Smog in
one city may be due to exorbitant levels of nitrogen oxide
("NOx"); in another, NOx controls may actually increase smog
formation. 43 As a result, centralized environmental regulation
is inherently limited by "the inability of central planners to
gather and process the information needed to write directives
appropriately responsive to the diverse and changing
conditions of different economic actors; and the failure of
central planning commands to provide the necessary incentives
and flexibility for environmentally and economically beneficial
innovation."44

42. Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing
Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585, 586-87 (1996).
43. This is because smog formation is largely determined by the ratio of NOx to
hydrocarbons in the ambient air. Meteorlogical conditions can also play a
substantial role.
44. Stewart, supra note 42, at 587.
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Governmental institutions are also heavily resistant to
change. Legislatures struggle to reach consensus, and
bureaucratic agencies burrow into ruts that keep them on
courses long past their usefulness. 45 Indeed, programs can
survive long after it is demonstrated that they cause more harm
than good. The world has changed dramatically in the past
three decades, and yet the environmental regulatory
framework in place in 2000 is much the same as it was in 1970.
Most of the changes have merely been the addition of levels to
the administrative layer cake rather than reinventions or
reorientations of programs and initiatives.
For many years political scientists held out the hope that
"scientific management" by the best and brightest could
address environmental concerns. 46 It was postulated that wellintentioned experts could succeed where markets failed. No
such luck. "If qualified managers with good intentions were
sufficient to ensure sound decisionmaking, Yellowstone would
be the Eden of the national parks."47 Instead, Yellowstone
National Park is grossly mismanaged-"[r]ather than
preserved, it is being destroyed."48 Public management, or
rather political management, is failing. No matter how wellintentioned the public official, the incentives she faces run
contrary to sound resource management.49 If a forest manager
improves management or saves money on timber sales, she
risks a smaller appropriation in the next Congress. If a park
ranger solves an ecological problem in a National Park, she
risks losing resources to more "urgent" problems.
In his landmark study of bureaucracy, James Q. Wilson
observed that "[t]here is a kind of Gresham's law at work in
45. LUDWIG VON MISES, LIBERALISM IN THE CLASSICAL TRADITION, 102 (3d. ed.
1985) ("[B]ureaucratic management in any case continues to suffer from the
unwieldiness and the lack of ability to adjust itself to changing conditions that
have everywhere led public enterprises from one failure to another.").
46. See generally ROBERT H. NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS (1995)
(documenting the development and eventual failure of "scientific management" of
federal lands).
47. Michael Copeland, The New Resource Economics, in THE YELLOWSTONE
PRIMER 13 Gohn A. Baden & Donald Leal eds., 1990).
48. ALSTON CHASE, PLAYING GOD IN YELLOWSTONE 6 (1987). For a similar
indictment of federal management of Rocky Mountain National Park, see
generally KARL HESS, ROCKY TIMES AT ROCKY MOUNTAIN NATIONAL PARK (1993).
49. See VON MISES, supra note 45, at 102 ("[M]anagers, as functionaries of the
state, do not have the personal interest in the success or failure of the business that
is characteristic of the management of private enterprises.").
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many government bureaus: Work that produces measurable
outcomes tends to drive out work that produces unmeasurable
outcomes."50 On federal lands, this means that things like
dollars spent, road-miles built or- in days gone by-- acres cut
displaces a focus on the health of the land and ecological
values. Similarly, in the EPA's Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance, the number of criminal convictions and
amount of fines issued are more important than the actual
amount of cleanup achieved. 51
Given the incentives faced by bureaucracies, high profile
actions tend to drive out less flashy, but arguably more
important measures. Thus, a President can burnish his
environmental credentials by unilaterally ordering National
Monument designations while federal lands languish due to
shortfalls in budgets for maintenance and other routine
expenditures. The Secretary of the Interior can grab the front
page by announcing measures to protect the bald eagle or some
other charismatic megafauna, while less attractive but no less
important species receive little support. 52 Put another way,
"bureaucrats also tend to favor programs with visible benefits
and invisible costs."53 This can make for good politics, but it
does not advance environmental protection.
If public sector management places environmental resources
at the mercy of public sector employees and the incentives they
face, it also makes such resources vulnerable to special interest
groups that seek to use government power to their advantage.
Attempts "to gain a competitive advantage through
manipulation of the regulatory process" are "occurring with
increasing frequency," according to former Environmental
Protection Agency Deputy Administrator A. James Barnes. 54
This inefficient interference by special interests, known as

50. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 155 (1989).
51. See Jonathan H. Adler, Bean Counting for a Better Earth: Environmental
Enforcement at the EPA, REG., Spring 1998, at 40-48.
52. See Don Coursey, The Revealed Demand for a Public Good: Evidence from
Endangered and Threatened Species, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 411 (1998) (noting wide
disparity in money spent to recover different endangered species).
53. Copeland, supra note 47, at 17-18; see also Terry L. Anderson, The New
Resource Economics: Old Ideas and New Applications, AM. J. AGRIC. ECON., Dec. 1982,
at 929.
54. A. James Barnes, How to Milk EPA's Smog Rules for Fun and Profit, SAC. BEE,
Mar. 30,1994, at B7.
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"rent-seeking," is facilitated by the fact that firms have the
ability to receive concentrated benefits through government
action, whereas the costs are dispersed throughout the whole.
of society. 55 In the regulatory context, rent-seeking typically
consists of pursuing those government interventions that will
provide comparative advantage to a particular industry or
subsector. By restricting entry or reducing output, regulations
can serve to reduce competition and cartelize an industry and
potentially increase returns.
Rent-seeking has become rather pervasive in regulatory
programs- provisions that benefit specific politically
influential interests are relatively easy to hide from public
scrutiny in the Code of Federal Regulations. Environmental
regulation is a particularly attractive venue for rent-seeking
because environmental protection is so popular. 56 Special
interest policies become more politically palatable when given
a green veneer. In other cases, existing regulations are tweaked
to advantage one firm or industry over another. Yet as
environmental policies get manipulated to serve narrow
interests, their ability to meet environmental goals is
compromised, if not sacrificed altogether. To take one
prominent example, the EPA proposed changes to the
reformulated gasoline program in 1994 to increase the use of
/Frenewable" fuel sources by mandating that a minimum
percentage of oxygen-enhancing fuel additives from ethanol or
ethanol-derived sources. This rule would have done nothing to
improve environmental quality. Indeed, the EPA "even
conceded that use of ethanol might possibly make air quality
worse."57 The EPA knew the problems with the rule, but
55. See generally Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political
Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL.
L. REV. 845 (1999) (describing the phenomenon of rent-seeking in environmental
policy).
56. See C. Ford Runge, Trade Protectionism and Environmental Regulations: The
New Nontariff Barriers, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 47, 47 (1990) ("Because
environmental standards have a growing national constituency, they are
especially attractive candidates for disguised protectionism."); see also Robert E.
McCormick, A Review of the Economics of Regulation: The Political Process, in
REGULATION AND THE REAGAN ERA: POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 27-28 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 1989) ("There is abundant
evidence in the economics literature that when the flag of public interest is raised
to support regulation, there is always a private interest lurking in the
background.").
57. 59 Fed. Reg. 39,268 (1994), cited in Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113,
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pushed ahead anyway. Why? Because the ethanol lobby would
benefit. 58 Unfortunately, this is hardly an isolated example. 59
Worse, as the pages in the Federal Register devoted to
environmental· regulation proliferate, so will the opportunities
and incentives for rent-seeking.

III. PROPERTY-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
THE FREE MARKET ALTERNATIVE
The problem with the dominant approach to environmental
policy is its reliance upon centralized political mechanisms. The
limitations of such mechanisms- whether regulations, fiscal
instruments, or direct management of environmental
resources- hamper the effectiveness of existing environmental
programs. As environmental problems become ever more
complex, these limitations will only become more severe. The
answer is not greater government control or manipulation of
the marketplace, but a greater reliance upon property rights
and voluntary arrangements. By encouraging a more efficient
use of resources, responsible stewardship, and technological
innovation, property rights in environmental resources provide
a sounder foundation for the advancement of environmental
values than the modern regulatory state.
protection- commonly
Property-based
environmental
referred to as "free market environmentalism"60 or "FME"rejects the "market failure" model. "Rather than viewing the
world in terms of market failure, we should view the problem
of externalities as a failure to permit markets and create markets
where they do not yet-or no longer-exist."61 Where
1119 (1995) (invalidating EPA-reformulated gasoline regulations due to lack of
statutory authority).
58. See John Dillin, EPA Stirs Debate on Benefits of Ethanol Fuel Additive,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 30, 1994, at 1 (reporting on EPA Administrator
Carol Browner's and Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy's explicit acknowledgment
that the rule was issued in part to assuage the concerns of the ethanol industry).
See generally Adler, supra note 8 (providing a history of thereformulated gasoline
program and the pervasive role of the special interest politics in it).
59. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, supra note 8 (documenting
examples
of
rent-seeking
in
environmental
policy);
POLffiCAL
ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 14 (same); Zywicki, supra note 55 (same).
60. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET
ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991). For additional formulations of free-market
environmentalism, see ECOLOGY, LIBERTY & PROPERTY: A FREE MARKET
ENVIRONMENTAL READER Oonathan H. Adler ed., 2000); BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON
SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1997).
61. Fred L. Smith, Jr., Conclusion: Environmental Policy at the Crossroads, in
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environmental problems are most severe it is typically a lack of
markets, in particular a lack of enforceable and exchangeable
property rights, that is to blame. Resources that are privately
owned or managed and therefore are incorporated into market
institutions are typically well-maintained. Environmental
problems, therefore, are "essentially property rights problems"
which are solved by the extension, definition, and defense of
property rights in environmental resources. 62
Resources that are unowned or politically controlled, on the
other hand, are more apt to be inadequately managed. In his
seminal essay on the "tragedy of the commons,"63 Garrett
Hardin gave an illustration of this principle, stating that there
is no incentive for any individual to protect the commonly
owned grazing pasture in a rural village. Indeed, it is in every
shepherd's self-interest to have his herd overgraze the pasture
and before any other herd. Every shepherd who acquires
additional livestock gains the benefits of a larger herd, while
the cost of overusing the pasture is spread across all members
of the village. The benefits of increased use are concentrated,
while the costs are dispersed. Inevitably, the consequence is an
overgrazed pasture, and everyone loses. The shepherd with
foresight, who anticipates that the pasture will become barren
in the future, will not exercise forbearance. Quite the opposite:
he will have the added incentive to overgraze now to capture
gains that otherwise would be lost. Refusing to add another
animal to one's own herd does not change the incentive of
every other shepherd to do so.
The world's fisheries offer a contemporary example of the
tragedy of the commons. Because oceans are unowned, no
fishing fleet has an incentive to conserve or replenish the fish it
takes, but each has every incentive to take as many fish as
possible lest the benefits of a larger catch go to someone else. 64
Efforts to control access through prescriptive regulations do
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, supra note 8, at 192.
62. Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners, Property Rights and Externalities: Problems
and Solutions, in WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? xi (Peter J. Hill & Roger E.
Meiners eds., 1998); see also ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 60, at 3 (stating that
"[a]t the heart of free market environmentalism is a system of well-specified
property rights to natural resources").
63. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 168 SCI. 1243 (1968).
64. See MICHAEL DE ALESSI, FISHING FOR SOLUTIONS 14 (lEA Environment Unit
1998).
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relatively little to change this equation. 65 Shorten the fishing
season, and the fishing merely becomes more intense. Limit the
use of certain gear, and fishennen will simply employ more
hands to maximize the catch. Private ownership overcomes the
commons problem because owners can prevent overuse by
controlling access to the resource. As Hardin noted, "The
tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted by private
property, or something formally like it."66 In the case of
fisheries, the creation of property rights, whether in fisheries
themselves or portions of a given catch, promotes sustainable
fishing practices. 67 With property rights, the incentives faced by
fishing fleets are aligned with the long-term sustainability of
the underlying resource. As conservation scholar R.J. Smith
explains:
Wherever we have exclusive private ownership, whether it
is organized around a profit-seeking or nonprofit
undertaking, there are incentives for the private owners to
preserve the resource. . . . [P]rivate ownership allows the
owner to capture the full capital value of the resource, and
self-interest and economic incentive drive the owner to
maintain its long-term capital value. 68

For incentives to work, the property right to a resource must
be definable, defendable, and divestible. Where property rights
are insecure, owners are less likely to invest in improving or
protecting a resource. In many tropical nations, for example,
the lack of secure property rights encourages deforestation as
there is no incentive to maintain forest land, let alone invest in
replanting. 69 Where existing environmental regulations
undermine the security of property rights, they discourage
conservation. The foremost example of this is the ESA, which
effectively punishes private landowners for owning habitat of
endangered species by restricting land-use. As Sam Hamilton,
former Fish and Wildlife Service administrator for the State of
Texas, noted, "The incentives are wrong here. If I have a rare
metal on my property, its value goes up. But if a rare bird
65. See id. at 31-35.
66. Hardin, supra note 63, at 1243.
67. See DE ALESSI, supra note 64, at 68-74.
68. Robert J. Smith, Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private
Property Rights in Wildlife, 1 CATO J. 439, 456 (1981).
69. See Roger A. Sedjo, Forests: Conflicting Signals, in THE TRUE STATE OF THE
PLANET 177, 204 (Ronald Bailey ed., 1995) [hereinafter TRUE STATE].
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occupies the land, its value disappears."70 This economic reality
creates a powerful incentive for landowners to destroy present or
potential habitat on private land. Thus, in North Carolina, timber
owners are dramatically shortening their cutting rotations and
cutting trees at a much younger age- at significant economic
cost- so as to avoid regulatory proscriptions that could force
them to lose their investments altogether. 71
To maximize the incentives for long-term sustainability,
owners must also be free to transfer their property rights to
others. Where rights are transferable, even someone indifferent
or hostile to environmental protection has an incentive to take
environmental concerns into account, because despoiling the
resource may reduce its value in the eyes of potential buyers.
Cars and homes that are privately owned are cared for better
than those that are rented. The role of government is to protect
property rights for environmental resources and enforce the
voluntary agreements property owners contract to carry out.
The creation of secure property rights necessarily entails
protecting property from private harm, such as that caused by
pollution. This is inherent in the idea of property. "Property
rights govern who has the right to use the environment in
which ways, and who has the duty to respect others' rights." 72
To harm someone's property by polluting it is no more
acceptable than to harm that property by vandalizing it. Thus
landowners used common law doctrines of nuisance and
trespass to defend against pollution for many years. 73 While
70. Betsy Carpenter, The Best-Laid Plans, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., October 4,
1993, at 89.
71. See Lueck, supra note 14, at 107·10.
72. ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE DEFENCE OF NATURE 18
(1995).
73. See id. See generally CTR. PRIVATE CONSERVATION, THE COMMON LAW
APPROACH TO POLLUTION PREVENTION: A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (1998); THE
COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR
MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morris eds., 2000)
[hereinafter COMMON LAW AND ENVIRONMENT]; YANDLE, supra note 60; Meiners
& Yandle, Clean Water Legislation: Reauthorize or Repeal?, in TAKING THE
ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY, supra note 22, at 88-93; Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle,
Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV.
923 (1999); Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law Environmentalism, 94 PUB.
CHOICE 99 (1998); Roger E. Meiners, Elements of Property Rights: The Common Law
Alternative, in LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990s' PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION (Bruce
Yandle ed., 1995); Todd J. Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the
Common Law: An Institutional Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions to
Large Number Externality Problems,46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961 (1996).
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common law principles no longer form the basis of pollution
control efforts in the United States, these doctrines still provide
robust protection for water quality in rivers and streams in
parts of England. 74 For property rights to serve environmental
goals, it is essential to apply common-law-style liability rules to
pollution problems?5
Whether a free market paradigm for environmental
protection is better or worse than the "market failure"
paradigm is an empirical question; 76 "the real comparison one
must make in contemplating a regulatory intervention is that
between an admittedly imperfect market and what will
inevitably be imperfect regulation." 77 While reliance upon
market institutions will not lead to ecological paradise, the
empirical evidence shows quite dearly that ecological concerns
are better cared for when incorporated into market institutions
through property rights and exchange than left dependent
upon government beneficence for protection.
If private markets were a greater threat to environmental
protection, one would expect government agencies to do a
better job at protecting environmental values than private
actors. Indeed one might even expect environmental quality to
correlate with government intervention in the economy. Yet the
opposite is the case. Private ownership of ecological resources,
for all its faults, outperforms political management. While
some critics charge that private owners are short-sighted, ,
private firms devote significantly greater resources to
maintaining the value of their capital stock. 78 The more political
institutions seek to replicate the incentive structures inherent in
private ownership, the more reliable and responsible ecological
74. See Roger Bate, Protecting English and Welsh Rivers: The Role of the Anglers'
Conservation Association, in COMMON LAW AND ENVIRONMENT, supra note 73, at 8687.
75. For a discussion of how common law rules can be used to protect property
rights in environmental resources, see Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen
Suits, Standing and Environmental Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F., at Part
IV (forthcoming 2001).
76. It can also be seen as an ethical question. See Paul Heyne, Economics, Ethics,
and Ecology, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY, supra note 22, at 25-47.
77. Paul R. Portney, EPA and the Evolution of Federal Regulation, in PUBLIC
POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 16 (Paul R. Portney & Robert N.
Stavins eds., 2d ed. 2000).
78. See Richard L. Stroup & Sandra L. Goodman, Property Rights, Environmental
Resources, and the Future, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 427, 440-43 (1992)
(comparing public and private mass transit services).
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management becomes.
While the U.S. is the world's greatest timber producer, it is
also experiencing tremendous forest regrowth. 79 Each of the six
national timber inventories conducted between 1952 and 1991
found greater forest volume than the one before. 80 The lion's
share of this regeneration is occurring on private land. 81 Private
timberlands account for approximately eighty-five percent of
total tree planting and seeding. 82 Some timber companies also
make investments in wildlife management and recreation to
generate income in the decades between cutting rotations. 83
Private timberlands are not perfect, of course. Yet they compare
quite favorably with their politically managed counterparts.
The federal government owns approximately one-third of
the United States84 -one of every three acres-and much of it is
the worse for wear. Forest Service analysts warned for years of
the impending buildup of fuel in the national forests, yet
nothing was done. The record-setting wildfires throughout the
western United States in 2000 were the inevitable result of this
mismanagement. 85 The forests are not the only lands being
neglected, though. The National Park Service faces a
maintenance backlog in excess of $12 billion. 86 Improper
wildlife management in Yellowstone and Rocky Mountain
National Parks has led to overgrazing, increasing risks to
biodiversity. 87 Yet a lack of resources is not the problem.
Federal land management expenditures, measured in dollars
per acre, have more than tripled since 1962. 88
79. See Sedjo, supra note 69, at 189-90.
80. See id. at 185.
81. See Jonathan H. Adler, Poplar Front: The Rebirth of America's Forests, in
ECOLOGY, LIBERTY & PROPERTY 65, 72 (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2000) (citing U.S.
Forest Service report that found increasing timber volume for all ownerships save
national forests).
82. See Sedjo, supra note 69, at 203.
83. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENVIRO-CAPITALISTS: DOING
GOOD WHILE DOING WELL 4-8 (1997).
84. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 240
(1999).
85. See Robert H. Nelson, Fires by Design, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2000, at A25; see
also ROBERT NELSON, A BURNING ISSUE: A CASE FOR ABOLISHING THE U.S. FOREST
SERVICE (2000).
86. GAO, National Park Service: Efforts to IdentifY and Manage the Maintenance
Backlog, GAO/RCED-98-143, May 1998, at 3.
87. See HOLLY LIPPKE FRETWELL, PUBLIC LANDS-FEDERAL ESTATE: IS BIGGER
BETTER? 6 (2000).
88. See id. at 5.
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Federal land mismanagement is instead the inevitable result
of political control of environmental resources and the
incentives such control creates. Even the most professional
natural resource specialists employed by federal agencies are
limited by the political nature of managing federally-owned
lands. Private owners- whether corporations or non-profit
land trusts- bear the costs of poor management decisions and
have strong incentives to maintain their property. Yet as noted
above, managers of federal lands face no such incentives. 89
Whereas private owners view maintenance expenditures and
the like as investments in existing assets, government entities
"treat all maintenance expenditures as current operating
expenses that must be financed through current revenues."90
The incentives faced by government agencies are simply not
conducive to sound resource management.
Corporations large and small are subject to substantial fines.
Executives and managers face jail time for environmental
violations. 91 Federal officials, on the other hand, face no such
risks. While federal facilities are generally supposed to meet
the same environmental requirements, enforcement and
compliance are spotty. One in four federal facilities were out of
compliance with the applicable clean water standards in 1996, a
higher rate than for equivalent facilities in the private sector. 92
Yellowstone National Park is supposed to be one of the crown
jewels in the National Park System. Yet in 1998 and 1999 park
officials allowed tens of thousands of gallons of raw sewage to
flow untreated into local waterways. 93
The comparison between private and political ecological
performance is most stark when one considers the ecological
legacy of the former Soviet nations. These nations were not
without their environmental laws, but state control of the
89. See NELSON, supra note 46 (providing a more thorough critique of federal
land management, and the failure of "scientific management" on federal lands);
see also FRETWELL, supra note 87 (same).
90. Stroup & Goodman, supra note 78, at 439.
91. Even relatively minor environmental violations can land an individual in
jail. See, e.g., John D. Copeland, The Criminalization of Environmental Law: The
Implications for Agriculture, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 237, 267-68 (1995) (recounting the
prosecution and conviction of Bill Ellen and others for relatively minor wetland
violations).
92. See David Armstrong, The Nation's Dirty, Big Secret, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14,
1999, at A1 (reporting results of an EPA Inspector General investigation).
93. See id.
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economy was also an ecological disaster. The fall of the Berlin
Wall revealed toxic pollution far in excess of anything that had
been imagined. Our worst ecological nightmares were the
Soviet nations' environmental reality. In 1988 a single Ukranian
city, Zaporozhe, released toxic emissions equivalent to
approximately one-third of all American emissions at the
time. 94 Potable drinking water was scarce and Soviet forests
were decimated. 95 In just under thirty years, the Aral Sea was
drained by 66 percent to subsidize irrigation, and fish
populations were decimated. 96 The lack of private ownership
left no one with any incentive to care about preserving
ecological values.
Socialist systems are also worse for environmental protection
because they sacrifice the natural ecological benefits of marketdriven efficiency gains. In the simplest of terms, market
competition creates tremendous pressure to minimize costs,
and that means finding ways of doing more with lessproducing more widgets with less material and energy. Over
time, market economies produce a continued decline in the
energy and material inputs necessary for a unit of industrial
output. This can be seen in the replacement of copper with
fiber optics (made from silica - i.e., sand), the downsizing of
computer circuitry, the light weighting of packaging/ the
explosion of agricultural productivity, and so on. 97 Less
material is used and disposed of, reducing overall
environmental impacts from productive activity. This same
trend is rarely evident in socialist economies where, on
average, it took nearly three times as much energy to produce a
given unit of goods or services.98 Almost the same ratio existed
94. See PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & KAREN LAFOLLETTE, MELTDOWN: INSIDE THE
SOVIET ECONOMY 32 (1990).
95. See id. at 34-35.
96. See Richard L. Stroup & Jane S. Shaw, Environmental Harms from Federal
Government Policy, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY, supra note 22, at 52.
For more on the horrific Soviet environmental legacy, see MURRAY FESHBACH &
ALFRED FRIENDLY, JR., ECOCIDE IN THE USSR: HEALTH AND NATION UNDER SIEGE
(1991).
97. See generally Lynn Scarlett, Doing More with Less: Dematerialization-Unsung
Environmental Triumph, in EARTH REPORT2000: REVISTING THE TRUE STATE OF THE
PLANET (Ronald Bailey ed., 1999); Indur M. Goklany, Richer Is More Resilient:
Dealing with Climate Change and More Urgent Environmental Problems, in EARTH
REPORT 2000: REVISTING THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET (Ronald Bailey ed., 1999).
98. See MIKHAIL BERNSTAM, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
24 (1991).
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for steel. 99 The key to such improvements is a system of welldefined and enforced property rights. International studies of
economic and environmental trends demonstrate that
"environmental quality and economic growth rates are greater
in regimes where property rights are well defined than in
regimes where property rights are poorly defined."100
Indeed, the record of the past century should conclusively
demonstrate that incorporating resources into the marketplace
through the creation and protection of property rights is the
surest means of replacing shortages with ample supply, and
encouraging sustainable development. 101 As one looks around
the world at which resources are protected and which 'are
imperiled, a clear pattern emerges. Tropical forests, largely
owned by governments or left as unowned commons, are in
decline; temperate forests, predominantly in wealthy countries
and often privately owned, are stable and expanding.102 Fish
stocks in the open oceans are declining, while aquaculture
booms and fisheries with quasi-property rights in New
Zealand and elsewhere maintain sustainable catches. 103
Proven reserves of copper, iron, bauxite, and oil, among
many other resources, have skyrocketed over the past several
decades. 104 Prices for all these minerals- the surest measure of
scarcity- have also declined. Indeed, the near-universal trend
for natural resources managed primarily through market
institutions is one of less scarcity and greater abundance. 105

99. See id.
100. Seth W. Norton, Property Rights, the Environment and Economic Well-Being, in
WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 37, 51 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds.,
1998); see also DON COURSEY & CHRISTOPHER HARTWELL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND
PUBLIC HEALTH OUTCOMES: AN INTERNATIONAL AND HISTORICAL COMPARISON
(Irving B. Harris Sch. Pub. Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 00.10, 2000), abstract
available at http:/ fwww.harrisschool.uchicago.edu/wpjwp_00-10.html (finding
that, across the board, greater government regulation of private activity correlates
with higher levels of emissions and poorer public health indicators).
101. See generally Jerry Taylor, The Challenge of Sustainable Development, REG.,
Winter 1994, at 35.
102. See Sedjo, supra note 69, at 179.
103. See Michael De Alessi, Fishingfor Solutions: The State of the World's Fisheries,
in EARTH REPORT 2000: REVISTING THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET 86 (Ronald
Bailey ed., 1999); Kent Jeffreys, Rescuing the Oceans, in TRUE STATE, supra note 69, at
295,309.
104. See Taylor, supra note 101, at 37-38; see also Stephen Moore, The Coming Age
ofAbundance, in TRUE STATE, supra note 69, at 109, 115-16.
105. See Taylor supra note 101, at 37-38; see also Stephen Moore, The Coming Age
ofAbundance, in TRUE STATE supra note 69, at 109.
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Much the same can be said of agriculture in nations where
farmers own the land and reap the benefits of their own hard
work and investment.106 From 1961 to 1994, per capita food
production increased nearly twenty percent and per capita
agriculture production increased nearly as much. 107
The environmental defense of the marketplace is not a
defense of the status quo. Despite the dramatic gains of the past
several decades, vast room for improvement remains.
Environmental protection is an important societal goal, but it
will not be achieved if existing policies and institutional
arrangements are left in place. The ecological agenda of the
next several years should focus on the creative extension of
market institutions and the removal of government
interventions that distort market transactions and obstruct the
development of private solutions to environmental concerns.

IV. PRINCIPLES FOR REFORM
Reforming environmental policy will not be easy; policy
revolutions are not made overnight. Adhering to a set of
principles can guide reform efforts and avoid some of the
pitfalls and cul..de-sacs that can derail promising policy
changes. In the environmental context, these principles should
seek to reduce government interventions that distort economic
and environmental dedsionmaking or subsidize environmental
harm, promote technological development and wealth creation,
develop and expand property rights in environmental
resources, hold private actors accountable for the
106. This is not always true in the United States due to extensive farm subsidies
that depress production. However, the United States's market economy is a
tremendous driver of technological advance, which helps increase per-acre food
yields.
107. See Paul Georgia et al., Benchmarks: The Ecological and Economic Trends that
Are Shaping the Natural Environment and Human Societies, in EARTH REPORT 2000:
REVISITING THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET 260-61, 256-57 (Ronald Bailey ed.,
1999).
This has tremendous ecological benefits as increases in agricultural productivity
reduce the stress that rising global population and food demand otherwise place
on habitat and undeveloped lands. Had agricultural productivity not improved
since the 1960s, producing the amount of food the world demands today would
require nearly twice the amount of cropland. See Jonathan H. Adler, Biosafe or
Biosorry?, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL L. REV. 761 (2000) (discussing importance of
technological advance and increased agricultural production to biodiversity
protection); Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry Than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary
Principle and the Proposed International Biosafety Protocol, 35 TX. INT'L L.J. 173, 198202 (2000) (same).
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environmental harms they cause, and foster ecological
innovation by decentralizing dedsionmaking. Not every
principle will be applicable in every environmental policy
context. Yet together they represent a new science of
environmental protection that can lead to greater
environmental progress in the years to come.
A. First, Do No Harm

Many government programs cause or encourage
environmental harm. The federal government is far and away
the nation's largest polluter. Nationwide there are
approximately 50,000 sites contaminated by the federal
government. Cleanup will cost an estimated $235-$389 billion,
according to the General Accounting Office. 108 Merely cleaning
up the lands used for military training and target practice will
cost tens of billions of dollars. 109 In addition, numerous
programs, including various subsidies for politically favored
industries, encourage further environmental degradation.
Subsidized disaster insurance and beach "restoration"
programs reduce the cost of construction in flood plains and
fragile coastal zones. Subsidized recreation on federal lands
leads to overcrowding and ecological decline as sensitive lands,.
quite literally, are trampled underfoot.
Environmental problems that result from government
programs are often themselves the rationale for expansive
regulatory efforts. Thus, government subsidization of
environmental harm costs Americans twice: first when they are
taxed to pay for the programs, and again when they are taxed
or regulated to address the problem that the government
helped to create in the first place. Federally funded water
projects and irrigation subsidies artificially lower water prices,
producing fears of water shortages in years with low rainfall
and calls for "efficiency" standards on showers, washing
machines and toilets. 110 The Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers dam and redirect rivers, disrupting
108. GAO, Federal Facilities: Consistent Relevant Risk Evaluations Needed for
Prioritizing Cleanups, GAO/RCED-96-150, June 1996, at 29.
109. According to the Defense Science Board, cleaning five percent of such
lands would cost an estimated $15 billion. See David Armstrong, Government as
Polluter: More Costly Cleanup on Horizon, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14,1999, at A33.
110. See Ben Lieberman, Potty Politics, WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 1998, at 30, 31.
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watersheds, fragmenting habitat, and dislocating species,111
and in the process fuel calls for greater wetland regulation and
species recovery efforts. 112 By some estimates, "30 percent of
the loss of forested wetlands in the lower Mississippi Valley
resulted from private conversions encouraged by federal flood
control projects."113
Some congressional leaders are proud of a new multi-billiondollar plan to restore the Florida Everglades, but they should
ask why such a massive restoration effort is required in the first
place. 114 The Corps of Engineers began to remold the Florida
Everglades in 1948 with disastrous results. Corps-built canals
facilitated agricultural and residential development, increasing
runoff and contamination. Species numbers and biodiversity
dropped dramatically. Everglades destruction was fueled
further by sugar subsidies that cost consumers an estimated
$1.4 billion per year. 115 Now the Corps is proposing a $7.8
billion restoration project to undue some of the damage that
federal policies brought. 116
The single most effective step that the federal government
could take to advance environmental protection is to adopt an
environmental Hippocratic Oath to "first, do no harm" to the
environment. By cleaning up its own act, the government could
do much to reduce environmental harms. This not only means
improving the compliance and performance records of
government agencies and facilities, but also putting an end to
government programs that encourage environmental
degradation or wasteful use of resources. The federal budget
should be scrubbed from top to bottom to eliminate programs
that generate significant environmental impacts. Even

111. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, Engineers of Power; Inside the Army Corps,
WASH. POST, Sept. 10,2000, at A1 (discussing the environmental legacy of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers).
112. It should be noted with some irony that the Corps is also the federal
agency with primary responsibility for wetland regulation.
113. PAUL F. SCODARI, MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF FEDERAL WETLANDS
PROGRAMS 16 (1997) (citing Robert N. Stavins & Adam B. Jaffe, Unintended Impacts
of Public Investments on Private Decisions: The Depletion of Forested Wetlands, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 337,349 (1990)).
114. See Michael Grunwald, In Everglades, a Chance for Redemption, WASH. POST,
Sept. 14, 2000, at A1.
115. See GAO, Sugar Program: Changing Domestic and International Conditions
Require Program Changes, GAO/RCED-93-84, April1993.
116. See Grunwald, supra note 111.
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programs that indirectly subsidize excess resource use by
funding industrial research and development should be
eliminated. The Energy Information Administration estimates
that the government grants aggregate energy subsidies of
between $5 billion and $10 billion per year, approximately $2
billion of which is devoted to research and development
programs that benefit particular energy industries. 117
Greenhouse warming may or may not be a problem that
requires urgent government attention, but it should be clear
that there is little reason for the federal government to
subsidize research and development of fossil fuels.
It is not only the federal budget that needs to be greened in
this way. Existing tax and regulatory policies can also induce
environmental damage. Consider the estate tax. This tax is
levied upon transfers of wealth in any form at the time of death
at a rate of up to 55 percent. This creates a powerful incentive
for landowners to subdivide and develop their land,
particularly in rural areas where landowners may be "land rich
and cash poor." For them, subdividing or developing inherited
land is the only way to pay the estate tax. The average annual
household income for a tree farmer is under $50,000, according
to the Joint Economic Committee.118 Yet the average tree farm
has a book value of $2 million or more. 119 When a tree farmer
dies, there is simply no way for his family to pay the estate tax
without clearing timber or selling off land. For this reason the
estate tax has accelerated the cutting of timber on private land.
"If estate taxes were not assessed by the government,
thousands of acres of privately owned land would be protected
from development," notes Dennis "Duke" Hammond, a
biological scientist with the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish
Commission. 120
117. See Energy Info. Admin., Federal Energy Subsidies: Direct and Indirect
Interventions in Energy Markets, at x, 6 (Nov. 1992). This study also notes that
regulations do more to distort energy markets than subsidies at existing levels. See
id. at x.
118. See }OINT ECON. COMM., 105TH CONG., THE ECONOMICS OF THE ESTATE TAX
50 (1998).
119. See Reducing the Tax Burden: Hearing Before House Comm. on Ways and Means,
105th Cong. 126 (1998) (statement of Douglas P. Stinson), available at
http:/ fwaysandmeans.house.gov /fullcomm/105cong/1-28-98/1-28stin.htm.
120. Dennis E. Hammond, Protecting Panther Habitat on Private Lands in Southern
Florida-A Current Assessment, in TRANS. 63D NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND
NATURAL RESOURCES CONFERENCE 459 (1998).
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Federal regulations, even environmental regulations, can
cause environmental harm as well. Detailed rules that dictate
how companies must meet particular projects leave little room
for environmental innovation. "Regulations that are overly
prescriptive can lock in existing technologies to the detriment
of other technologies that might meet or exceed requirements,"
concluded the Office of Technology Assessment in a 1995
report. 121 The Environmental Law Institute reached similar
conclusions in a recent study: "Technology-based emission
limits and discharge standards, which are embedded in most of
our pollution laws, play a key role in discouraging
innovation."122 At the same time, regulations that "grandfather"
existing facilities can artificially prolong the lives of older, less
efficient facilities, increasing pollution levels above what they
would otherwise be.
In a similar fashion, hazardous waste regulations can
increase the cost of handling items designated as "hazardous"
so much that companies are forced to dispose of materials that
could be profitably recycled or reused. While the EPA would
like fluorescent bulbs to be recycled because of their mercury
content, existing regulations push in the opposite direction. As
the EPA itself acknowledged, "additional costs associated with
managing, transporting, and disposing of lighting wastes as
hazardous wastes can create an additional disincentive to join
Green Lights [a voluntary federal energy-efficiency program]
and make the initial investment in energy-efficient light
technologies."123
Environmental regulations also have the potential to increase
risks to human health and safety.124 As Justice Breyer (then
Judge Breyer) observed, "one can find many examples of
regulators' ignoring one program's safety or environmental
effects upon another." 125 Thus, when the EPA sought to ban the

121. U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, lNNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION
OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 87-88 (1995).
122. !d. at 6.
123. 59 Fed. Reg. 38,290 (EPA 1994); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Wasted Lights,
REG., Spring 1996, at 15-18 (citing regulatory disincentives for corporations to
install more energy efficient lighting).
124. See generally Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle,
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851 (1996) (documenting the negative public health
impacts that often result from environmental regulation).
125. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
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use of asbestos in brake pads and applications, it ignored the
fact that likely alternatives posed a greater risk to public
health. 126 In promulgating tighter standards for ground-level
ozone ("smog"), the EPA ignored data suggesting that reducing
ground-level ozone could increase human exposure to
ultraviolet-B radiation and consequently increase skin cancer
rates. 127 Perhaps the most extreme examples of risky
environmental regulation are federal fuel economy standards
for automobiles. Designed to conserve energy, these
regulations result in vehicle downsizing which reduces
crashworthiness. The result, according to a Harvard-Brookings
study, is several thousand additional highway fatalities per
model year .128
In all of its activities, the federal government should adopt
the environmental equivalent of the Hippocratic Oath and
"first, do no harm." Before the government imposes mandates
or restrictions on the private sector, it should make sure its own
house is in order and eliminate environmentally-destructive
programs. 129 In a similar vein, environmental policies aimed at
reducing risks must not increase other risks in the process.
B. Green Through Growth

Economic progress is absolutely essential to environmental
progress. Environmental protection is a good, and like all
goods it must be purchased. A healthy economy is necessary to
many
finance
environmental
improvements.
While
environmental activists perceive a conflict between economic
growth and environmental progress, the opposite is true.
REGULATION 22 (1993); see also Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant, "More
Good Than Harm": A First Principle for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts,

20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 379, 390 (1993) (noting that "when agencies regulate a particular
substance or technology, they often fail to consider the secondary impacts of
regulation, such as the risks presented by substitute products or activities").
126. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
127. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 10271 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1999),
a.ff'd in part, rev'd in part, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001).
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the EPA's refusal to consider
the radiation-blocking potential of tropospheric ozone violated the CAA. See id. at
1051-53. The Supreme Court did not address that issue on review.
128. See Robert W. Crandall & John D. Graham, The Effect ofFuel Economy Standards
on Automobile Safety, 32J.L. & ECON. 97,110 (1989).
129. It should be noted that the National Environmental Policy Act does
relatively little in this regard, as it only requires the government to examine and
report the likely environmental impacts of federal projects. It has no substantive
requirement that such impacts be reduced.
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Sewage treatment facilities and other environmental
improvements are not free. Moreover, a significant body of
literature has found a correlation between economic
improvements and several measures of environmental quality.
Not only are wealthy communities healthier than poor
communities, but they also tend on average to be more
concerned about upholding environmental values as well. 130
Wealthier societies have both the means and the desire to
address a wider array of environmental concerns. 131 Economic
growth fuels technological advance and generates the resources
necessary to deploy new methods of meeting human needs
efficiently and effectively. Thus, wealthier societies tend to
provide for human needs in a more environmentally sound
manner. "Countries undergo an environmental transition as
they become wealthier and reach a point at which they start
getting cleaner."132 This occurs first with particularly acute
environmental concerns, such as access to safe drinking water
and sanitation services. As affluence increases, so does the
attention paid to conventional pollution concerns such as fecal
coliform bacteria and urban air quality. 133
In much the same way that wealthier societies become
cleaner, "wealthier is healthier."134 In other words, as income
increases, mortality and morbidity decline. 135 Conversely,
"when national income falls, there often is a significant increase

130. See generally RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SHIFT IN ADVANCED
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1990) (noting that societies become increasingly preoccupied
with quality of life issues, such as environmental protection, as they become more
affluent).
131. See Norton, supra note 100, at 45 (noting that, insofar as environmental
quality is viewed as a "good," "consumption" of environmental quality will
increase as wealth increases).
132. Indur Goklany, Richer Is Cleaner, in TRUE STATE, supra note 69, at 339, 341.
133. Goklany observes that while the "environmental transition" for drinking
water and sanitation occurs "almost immediately as the level of affluence
increases above subsistence," the transition appears to occur at approximately
$1,375 per capita for fecal coliform and $3,280 and $3,670 per capita for urban
particulate matter and sulfur dioxide concentrations respectively. Id. at 342. For a
fuller treatment of the correlation between affluence and air quality, see generally
GOKLANY, supra note 24.
134. See Aaron Wildavsky, Wealthier Is Healthier, REG., Jan.-Feb. 1980, at 10. For
a more complete discussion of this phenomenon, see AARON WILDAVSKY,
SEARCHING FOR SAFETY {1988).
135. See, e.g., Susan L. Ettner, New Evidence on the Relationship Between Income
and Health, 15 J. HEALTH ECON., 67 (1996); John D. Graham, Bei-Hung Chang &
JohnS. Evans, Poorer Is Riskier, 12 RISK ANALYSIS 333, 336 (1992).
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in mortality and a decline in health status."136 Expenditures on
regulatory compliance are rarely wealth enhancing, and
therefore increasing regulatory costs can reduce gains in public
health. 137 As Justice Stephen Breyer observed, "[a]t all times
regulation imposes costs that mean less real income available to
individuals for alternative expenditure[, which] itself has
adverse health effects."138
Wealthier societies are not only cleaner and healthier; they
are also more willing and able to devote resources to
environmental concerns. Public support for environmental
measures, both public and private, correlates with changes in
personal income. 139 In economic jargon, "[w]illingness to pay
for environmental measures ... is highly elastic with respect to
income." 140 Thus, it should be no surprise that donors to
environmental groups tend to have above average annual
incomes. Members of the Sierra Club, for example, have an
average household income more than double the U.S. average. 141
In the aggregate, environmental regulation can work against
continuing environmental progress by diverting tens· of billions
of dollars, if not more, away from wealth-creating activity.
Insofar as regulation reduces economic growth by diverting
investment and human energies away from productivity, it will
retard environmental progress. While this is true in the U.S., it

136. Is the Office of Management and Budget Interfering with Workers Health and
Safety Protection?: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 102d Cong. 43
(1992) (statement of James B. MacRae, Jr., Acting Administrator and Deputy
Administrator, Office ·of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of
Management and Budget). MacRae cited several studies, including a 1984 report
by Congress's Joint Economic Committee that found that declines in real per
capita income in the early 1970s led to a corresponding increase in total mortality,
amounting to as many as 60,000 additional deaths. See id. at 45 (citing JOINT ECON.
COMM., 981H CONG., ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE ON NATIONAL
HEAL1H AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING, J842-38 (1984)).
137. See generally Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of
Health/Health Analysis, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 729 (1995); Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality
Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 147 (1990).
138. BREYER, supra note 125, at 23.
139. This is also generally true for charity in general. See RICHARD B.
MCKENZIE, WHAT WENT RIGHT IN THE 1980s, at 70 (1994) (noting that "(h]igher
incomes lead to increased giving").
140. Richard L. Stroup & Roger E. Meiners, Introducton: The Toxic Liability
Problem: Why Is It Too Large?, in CUffiNG GREEN TAPE: TOXIC POLLUTANTS,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND 1HE LAW 15 (Richard L. Stroup & Roger E.
Meiners eds., 2000).
141. See id. (citing 1992 reader survey for Sierra magazine).
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is especially true in the poorest of nations. 142 Therefore,
environmental policy makers must always be conscious of the
costs of environmental measures, as increased compliance costs
can come at the expense of environmental improvement.
C. Promote and Protect Private Property

America has a proud conservation tradition demonstrating
that private owners serving as land and resource managers,
whether individuals, corporations, or environmental groups,
are superior to political entities. Rather than expanding
government ownership and regulation of threatened ecological
resources, policy makers should seek creative ways of
expanding property-based institutions into the ecological
realm.
As noted above, the creation of property interests empowers
owners to act as stewards of environmental resources and
facilitates conservation efforts in the private sector. Whereas
public or politically managed lands often suffer, "private
owners have the ability to protect their lands from over use
[sic]."143 The security of property rights encourages owners to
pursue the enhancement of their own subjective value
preferences, including both commercial and non-commercial
values. Property rights enable timber companies to protect their
investment in planting trees or enhancing forest growth, but they
also protect the investments made by conservation groups in
ecological protection and restoration. "Private ownership
includes not only hunting preserves, commercial bird breeders,
parrot jungles, and safari parks, it also includes wildlife
sanctuaries, Audubon Society refuges, World Wildlife Fund
preserves, and a multitude of private, non-profit conservation
and preservation projects."144 These organizations raise money
by soliciting contributions to acquire ownership in preferred
lands.
Whereas political conservation often generates a zero-sum

142. Goklany, supra note 132, at 370 ("[A]nything that unduly retards economic
growth in developing countries- including inefficient policies, no matter how
well intentioned- will ultimately retard net environmental progress and imperil
human lives.").
143. Council on Environmental Quality, Special Report: The Public Benefits of
Private Conservation, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1984, at 363, 367 (1984).
144. Smith, supra note 68, at 456.
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game in which only the most popular initiatives receive funding,
private property empowers forward-looking conservationists to
pursue unpopular ecological causes. At the turn of the last
century, groups such as the National Audubon Society were able
to use private property to protect threatened species habitat at a
time when there was no political support for government
action. 145 Similarly, at a time when governments and private
organizations encouraged the slaughter of raptors, one woman,
Ms. Rosalie Edge, was able to purchase Hawk Mountain to
protect birds cof prey from extirpation. While unpopular at the
time, Ms. Edge's purchase created one of the most important
raptor research sites in the world. 146 In a similar fashion, a
handful of individuals saved the bison from extinction on the
western plains at a time when the federal government was
subsidizing its slaughter.147 Were it not for these efforts, it is
unlikely that there would be any buffalo in Yellowstone National
Park today.
Property rights need not be individuated to serve
environmental goals. Collective entities, from conservation
groups to condominium associations, play an important role in
conservation. Additionally, the recognition of conservation
easements already empowers conservation groups to purchase
development rights from a given parcel of land and protect the
present ecological values. 148 There is no single property
arrangement that is appropriate for every resource, but this
does not mean that the institution of property ownership can
be disregarded in conservation efforts.
Time and again, the greatest conservation successes occur
when environmental resources are rescued from the tragedy of
British
the commons through the creation of property rights.
Columbia, for example, the halibut fishery was saved from ruin
by the introduction of private fishing rights. This change not
145. See JONATHAN H. ADLER, ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CROSSROADS 2-3
(1995).
146. See Robert J. Smith, Private Conservation Case Studies: Hawk Mountain
Sanctuary Association (Apr. 1, 1999), available at http:/ fwww.cei.org; see also
Council on Environmental Quality, supra note 143, at 387-94.
147. See Ike C. Sugg, Where the Buffalo Roam, and Why, EXOTIC WILDLIFE,
Jan/Feb. 1999 ("Bison were initially saved by six individuals who either saw
business oppprtunities in the existence of bison or simply wanted to save a
vanishing species." (quoting Dr. Valerius Geist)).
148. See STEPHEN EAGLE, CONSERVATION EASEMENTS AND PRIVATE LAND
STEWARDSHIP (1997) (discussing the use of conservation easements).
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only led to sustainable catch levels but also increased the
quality of the fish caught and the profitability of local fishing
operations. 149 The creation of private property rights advanced
conservation where regulation failed. Iceland and New
Zealand experienced similar success with the implementation
of a property-regime known as individual transferable
quotas. 150 In a similar fashion, allowing the commercial
utilization and quasi-ownership of elephants in Zimbabwe has
led to larger herds and the devotion of greater acreage to
wildlife habitat. 151 This not only benefits elephants, but also
other, less-marketable species which require similar habitat.
In some cases, private property rights exist, but they are too
narrow to allow for private conservation efforts. For decades,
many western states only recognized property rights in water
that was used for irrigation, drinking, or another productive
use. Leaving instream water flows to enhance fish habitat was
not deemed a productive use and could not be advanced
through private markef transactions. Over time, however,
states such as Oregon have begun to recognize property rights
in instream flows to varying degrees. 152 Today, local
environmental groups such as the Oregon Water Trust
purchase instream flows from farmers to improve salmon
habitat. 153 This approach can be more cost-effective, and
certainly less contentious, than pushing to tighten regulatory
restrictions on water use. This institutional change has
facilitated greater conservation by expanding the definition of
property rights to encompass environmental values.
Dr. Robert Nelson, who served in the Interior Department
for nearly two decades, has a similar proposal for the

149. See R. Quentin Grafton et al., Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A
Study ofa Common-Pool Resource, 43 J.L. & ECON. 679 (2000).
150. The Icelandic experience is chronicled in HANNES H. GISSURARSON,
OVERFISHING: THE ICELANDIC SOLUTION (lEt\ Studies Env't No. 17, 2000); See also
DE ALESSI, supra note64, at41-43.
151. IKE SUGG AND URS KREUTER, ELEPHANTS AND IVORY: LESSONS FROM THE
TRADE BAN 16, 51-53 (lEA Environment Unit 1994); see also Randy T. Simmons &
Urs P. Kreuter, Herd Mentality, 50 POL'Y REV. 46 (1989).
152. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING
THE INVISIBLE PUMP 111-32 (1997).
153. See ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 83, at 94-95. For an in-depth discussion
of the Oregon Water Trust, see Erin Schiller, Private Conservation Case Studies:
The Oregon Water Trust (Nov. 1, 1998), available at http:/ /www.cei.org/
CPCCase.asp.
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protection of grazing lands. 154 Under current law, federal land
grazing permits purchased by ranchers may only be used for
grazing cattle. Additional rules, such as base-property
ownership requirements, further restrict the marketability of
grazing permits. As a result, environmental groups that believe
it is necessary to reduce grazing on federal lands to protect
habitat or conserve rangeland have little choice but to seek
tighter regulations or the revocation of permits. Nelson's
proposal is to transform the grazing permits into forage-access
rights. Rather than leasing per!JlitS to graze cattle, the federal
government would instead lease or sell fully transferable
forage-access rights that could be used for grazing cattle or for
other uses, from recreation to conservation. Thus, a private
environmental organization could purchase forage-access
rights from the government or existing owners and opt to graze
elk, sponsor recreational use of the land in question, or simply
retire the permits and do nothing at all. Again, conservation
can be advanced by moving toward more complete property
rights in environmental resources.
D. Make the Polluter Pay

Making the polluter pay is merely an extension of the
principle that environmental protection should be focused on
the protection of property rights. Pollution control, at its heart,
is about preventing the forcible imposition of a waste or
emission by one person onto another. Therefore, pollution
control efforts should focus upon instances where an unwanted
emission causes actual harm and not on whether a company
complies with a permit or generates the "right" amount of
waste. Pollution control efforts should thus be seen as an
extension and complement to traditional nuisance doctrines
and their effort to keep pigs out of parlors, so to speak. 155
While the rhetoric of "polluter pays" is often bandied about
in environmental policy discussions, few environmental
programs embody this principle. Even enforcement efforts that
target polluters rarely impose fines or penalties in proportion
154. See Robert H. Nelson, How To Reform Grazing Policy: Creating Forage Rights
on Federal Rangelands, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 645 (1997) (outlining the proposal).
155. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (noting a
"nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor
instead of the barnyard").
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to the actual amount of pollution caused. 156 Current
environmental policy too rarely focuses on harm and too often
focuses on compliance with byzantine rules and requirements.157 Fines are levied not when the property of another is
contaminated, but when a permit is improperly filed or a
waste-transport manifest is not completed in line with the
demands of regulatory officials. 158 This is astonishing evidence
that many pollution-control efforts are misdirected. The proper
focus of government officials should be identifying and
prosecuting firms that tangibly threaten human health and
environmental properties rather than monitoring compliance
with overly complex and time-consuming permit and
paperwork requirements.
Polluters certainly should be held responsible. This requires
the application of traditional tort law principles, not the
erection of a sprawling bureaucracy. Liability should be based
upon the intrusion of one party into the property of another,
not on the violation of a bureaucratic proscription on how to
transport a substance or submit paperwork. Restitution should
be paid to those harmed, not simply to a government agency
that proclaims it will spend the money in the public interest.
Unfortunately, the ability of private parties to restrain
upstream polluters is limited in the United States today. In
some cases, traditional common law approaches have been
completely preempted by federal environmental laws. 159 An
important environmental reform would be to end this form of
preemption while, at the same time, requiring a demonstration
of harm in the prosecution of environmental violators. This is
particularly important in the context of citizen suits, through
which private individuals and groups enforce existing
environmental laws. Without a substantive harm requirement
and clear property interests in underlying resources, there is
156. See Adler, supra note 51, at 40-48.
157. Indeed, in a recent survey of corporate counsels, only 30 percent believed it
was even possible for their firms to achieve full compliance with applicable state
and federal environmental requirements. See Marianne Lavelle, Environmental
Vise: Law, Compliance, NAT'L L.J., August 30, 1993, at 51.
158. For instance, under the Clean Water Act, firms that violate permit
conditions can be fined up to $25,000 per violation, per day. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)
(2000). No demonstration of measurable environmental harm is necessary for such.
fines. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
159. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984); Conner v. Aerovox,
Inc., 730 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1984).
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likely to be excessive enforcement of environmental standards
that do little if anything to improve environmental quality. 160
Broad technology mandates or permit schemes operate as
ecological drift nets. Such approaches achieve pollution
reductions more through their scope than their efficiency, and
as a result, they tend to produce environmental improvements
at the expense of innocent individuals who have not
contributed to the harm. Even when the impacts of water or
airborne emissions are extremely difficult to control,
environmental protection and simple justice are better served
when pollution reduction efforts focus on the true sources of
pollution and ensure that it is the polluters who pay for the
damage.
Consider the case of air pollution. It is well-established that a
small fraction of automobiles are responsible for the vast
preponderance of auto-related emissions. Indeed, half of the
emissions in California are generated by only ten percent of the
cars on the road. 161 This means that for every ten cars, the
dirtiest one pollutes as much as the other nine. Nonetheless,
federal officials insist upon imposing significant costs on the
owners of all cars through "clean fuel" requirements, periodic
emission~inspections, and similar regulations in order to meet
federal air quality standards. If emission reductions are
necessary in some regions to protect human health (a debatable
proposition), targeting the dirtiest portion of the automobile
fleet will reduce pollution more efficiently and more equitably.
The majority of car owners whose vehicles are in dean-running
condition should not be forced to pay for the pollution caused
by an irresponsible minority. (Additionally, it is questionable
whether the federal government should tell local communities
what level of air emissions is acceptable.)
Making the polluter pay should not entail trying to eliminate
the generation of wastes and byproducts of a modern,
industrial society, nor does it mean regulating every emission,
every industrial process, indeed every aspect of economic life.
Making the polluter pay means focusing environmental
160. See generally Adler, supra note 75 (setting out argument more fully).
161. See DONALD STEDMAN ET AL., ON-ROAD REMOTE SENSING OF CO AND HC
EMISSIONS IN CALIFORNIA 13 (Cal. Air Res. Bd. 1994); J.G. Calvert et al., Achieving
Acceptable Air Quality: Some Reflections on Controlling Vehicle Emission, SCI., July 2,
1993, at 40.
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protection efforts on the greatest sources of harm and ensuring
that polluters pay for the costs of the harms they inflict upon
others.
E. Decentralize Decisionmaking

Although not every environmental problem will be solved
by removing government subsidies and not every
environmental concern is immediately amenable to the creation
of property rights, these are not excuses for maintaining the
status quo. Few if any environmental problems are national in
scope. Most are local or regional in nature. Therefore, few
environmental concerns require a national solution. Most
environmental concerns would be best handled at the level at
which the problem occurs. Wherever possible, policymakers
should decentralize environmental decisionmaking by
returning more power and authority to state and local
governments. Where problems have the potential to generate
substantial interstate externalities, the federal government
should support the development of interstate compacts and
regional approaches rather than assuming federal regulations
are the best solution. 162
Even though most environmental problems are local or
regional,
the federal
government dominates
most
environmental protection efforts. 163 Hazardous waste sites
impact local communities. Water quality is typically a local or
regional concern. Even the impact of urban air pollution is
often confined to a given airshed. 164 At the same time, state and
local governments are showing themselves willing and able to
address many environmental concerns. "The popular desire for
a dean environment can be realized with far more common
sense by returning control of local environmental issues to state
162. Where such solutions are impracticable, reliance on a "golden rule" for
resolving interstate externality problems seems advisable. Such an approach is
outlined in Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 44 DUKE
L.J. 931 (1997).
163. Indeed, this has been the source of substantial tension between the federal
and state governments. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the
Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1185 (1995) ("So much political power has been
reallocated to the federal government that, at times, the states could be mistaken
for vassals of the federal government.").
164. See Merrill, supra note 162, at 976-78 (noting reasons why "as a general
matter, transboundary pollution does not present an especially serious form of
harm relative to other types of multijurisdictional environmental phenomena").
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and local government/' according to David Schoenbrod, an
attorney formerly with the Natural Resources Defense
Council. 165
Twenty years ago, Richard Stewart noted the "sobering fact
is that environmental quality involves too many intricate,
and
institutional
geographically
variegated physical
166
interrelations to be dictated from Washington." This is even
more true today as environmental policy is increasingly
focused on smaller, more complex problems that are tied to
local conditions. Federalization of environmental law
inevitably results in "one-size-fits-nobody" regulations.
"Federal regulators never have been and never will be able to
acquire and assimilate the enormous amount of information
necessary to make optimal regulatory judgments that reflect
the technical requirements of particular locations and pollution
sources. "167
Environmental concerns and potential solutions are not the
same throughout the United States. To succeed in a given
locale, environmental policies must be tailored to local
conditions. State and local officials are apt to have local
expertise that is, in practice, unobtainable by national
agencies. 168 "The knowledge necessary to administer any air
pollution control program ... can be found only at the local
level."169 The relative sources and composition of urban air
pollution varies from place to place. The nature of air pollution
concerns in Phoenix, Arizona, differs from that in Atlanta,
Georgia. 170 Much the same can be said for most pollution
control issues. 171
165. David Schoenbrod, Time for the Federal Aristocracy to Give Up Power, in
POLICY STUDY No. 144, at 2 (Center for the Study of American Business 1998).
166. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196,
1266 (1977).
167. HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 27 (American Enterprise Institute 1996).
168. This is essentially Hayek's argument about the impossibility of centralizing
information. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 1
(1945). Of course, Hayek· might be skeptical about the ability to centralize
information at the state level as well. Nonetheless, Hayek supported federalist
systems. See F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 255-72 (1996).
169. Dwyer, supra note 163, at 1218.
170. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RETHINKING THE OZONE PROBLEM IN
URBAN AND REGIONAL AIR POLLUTION 351 {1991).
171. For example, soil composition and hydrology will affect the likelihood of
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When policies are nationalized, on the other hand, it can
become difficult to address the concerns of those communities
that suffer disproportionately from policy errors or omissions.
Local environmental concerns must compete against national
political priorities. A small town that needs to devote resources
to improving the quality of its drinking water must compete for
federal funds and attention with whatever environmental
concern is on the evening news. 172 Federal age:t;lCies and
national politicians are less responsive to local needs than more
local institutions and officials. As former Illinois EPA chief
Mary Gade explains, "States are closest to their constituents
and problems, bringing a necessary sensitivity and perspective
to local environmental issues that even EPA's 10 regional
offices, often many hundreds of miles away, can't have."173
Allowing local or regional control over regulation of
can
promote
healthy
environmental
problems
interjurisdictional competition for the best environmental
policies. 174 Allowing the states to operate as green "laboratories
of democracy"175 can produce both economic and
environmental gains. Both the theoretical and empirical
evidence demonstrate that "the possibility of competition will
and
product
lead
inexorably
to
experimentation
differentiation," and this, in turn, produces "innovation and
improvement."176
groundwater contamination from runoff or waste disposal; population density
and topography will affect the likely public health impact of industrial accidents;
weather patterns, such as the frequency of inversions, will affect ambient
concentrations of air pollutants; and so on.
172. See Keith Schneider, How a Rebellion over Environmental Rules Grew from a
Patch of Weeds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at A16 (quoting observation of
Columbus, Ohio health official that "the new rules coming out of Washington are
taking money from decent programs and making me waste them on less
important problems").
173. Mary Gade, When the States Come Marching In, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Winter 1996, at 4.
174. See generally Adler, supra note 25, at 625-32; Jonathan H. Adler, A New
Environmental Federalism, in FORUM FOR APPLIED RESEARCH AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1998); David L. Markell, States As Innovators: It's Time for a New Look at Our
"Laboratories of Democracy" in the Effort To Improve Our Approach to Environmental
Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347 (1994); ALEXANDER VOLOKH ET AL., RACE TO THE
TOP: THE INNOVATIVE FACE OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (Reason
Pub. Policy Inst., Policy Study No. 239, 1998).
175. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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Forty states have their own hazardous waste cleanup
program, many of which put the federal Superfund program to
shame by spending substantially less money than the federal
government. 177 It typically costs $25-30 million to clean up a
single site in the federal Superfund program, and the average
cleanup time is about ten years. By comparison, Minnesota is
cleaning up sites for less than $5 million each and completing
cleanups in only a few years. 178 Brownfield redevelopment
programs are talked about in Washington, D.C., but they are
actually happening at the state level. 179 Concerned that
environmental enforcement efforts are inordinately focused on
measures of "inputs," rather than tangible environmental
results, two dozen states have passed environmental audit
privilege laws since 1993.180 These laws reduce penalties for
companies that voluntarily disclose and correct environmental
violations, leading to the greater disclosure and cleanup of
pollution problems. New Jersey may have more costly
regulations than most states, but it was also the first state to
statutorily authorize multimedia environmental permits.181
This approach to permits increases the operational flexibility
afforded to regulated firms, and it consolidates reporting and
paperwork requirements while facilitating more accurate
emission inventories and reducing cross-media transfers of
pollutants. 182
The benefits of greater state and local control over
environmental decisionmaking can be seen in the land
management context as well. State wetland protection efforts
preceded federal regulation by over a decade, and state
programs are regularly developing new means of conserving
and restoring wetlands while the federal program remains
mired in controversy. 183 National forests lose money on timber
177. See J. WINSTON PORTER, CLEANING UP SUPERFUND: THE CASE FOR STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP 5 (Reason Pub. Policy Inst., Policy Study No. 195,
1995).
178. See id.
179. See generally GATTUSO, supra note 6.
180. See Adler, supra note 51, at 45.
181. See Jeanne Herb, Success and the Single Permit, ENVTL. FORUM, Nov./Dec.
1997, at 17.
182. See id. at 18.
183. See Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Wateifowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson:
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29
ENVTL. L. 1, 47-54 (1999) (discussing the history and performance of state wetland
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sales and have a poor record of environmental protection; state
forests, such as those in Montana, turn a profit from timber
management and have superior environmental performance. 184
States such as Texas and New Hampshire have taken steps to
make their parks self-sufficient while improving the services
offered to local residents. 185
This is not to say that no state will ever enact bad
environmental policy. States do and will continue to adopt
short-sighted policies in the environmental arena as in every
other area of public policy. It is also possible for states to
overregulate environmental matters. 186 The question should be
whether the decentralization of environmental policy-making,
viewed in the aggregate, is likely to improve environmental
protection. Given the stagnation of environmental reform
efforts at the federal level and the tremendous burst of
environmental innovation in many states, encouraging
environmental devolution is anything but anti-environmental.
Experimentation is necessary to develop the next generation of
environmental measures, and it will be more productive to
have fifty sets of experiments than to rely on only one.

V. CONCLUSION
The case for comprehensive environmental reform is clear.
Current environmental laws frustrate the development of
cleaner technologies, penalize landowners for owning habitat,
and fail to address the most significant environmental risks.
Those institutions upon which free and prosperous societies
are built- private property, voluntary exchange, freedom of
contract, and the rule of law- will better provide for the
protection of public health and ecological values. Such
approaches may not be perfect, but they hold more promise
than conventional strategies for environmental protection. It is
important to give them that chance.
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